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Globalization of micro-chip fabrication has opened a new avenue of cyber-crime. 
It is now possible to insert hardware Trojans directly into a chip during the manufacturing 
process.  These hardware Trojans are capable of destroying a chip, reducing performance 
or even capturing sensitive data.  To date, defensive methods have focused on detection 
of the Trojan circuitry or prevention through design for security methods.   
This dissertation presents a shift away from prevention and detection to a design 
methodology wherein one no longer cares if a Trojan is present or not.  The Randomized 
Encoding of Combinational Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage or RECORD process is 
presented in the first of three papers.  This chip design process utilizes dual rail encoding 
and Quilt Packaging to create a secure combinational design that can resist data leakage 
even when the full design is known to an attacker.  This is done with only a 2.28x-2.33 x 
area increase and 1.7x-2.24x increase in power.  The second paper describes a new 
method, Sequential RECORD, which introduces additional randomness and moves to 3D 
split manufacturing to isolate the secure areas of the design.  Sequential RECORD is 
shown to work with 3.75x area overhead and 4.5x power increase with a 3% reduction in 
slack.  Finally, the RECORD concept is refined into a Time Division Multiplexed (TDM) 
version in the third paper, which reduces area and power overhead by 63% and 56% 
respectively.  A method to safely utilize commercial chips based on the TDM RECORD 
concept is also demonstrated.  This method allows the commercial chip to be operated 
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Since the proliferation of computerized electronics in the 1980’s, hackers have 
been trying to gain unauthorized access to these personal computers or cause general 
mischief by developing malicious software.  This software is commonly known by many 
names: computer virus, worm, Trojan, etc. With the integration of the internet into 
everyday interactions the threat of a computer virus is a part of daily life.  The defenses 
are many and commercially available. Operating system patches to prevent virus exploits 
are a regular occurrence.  However, there is an underlying assumption common to all the 
defenses against computer viruses, namely that the hardware running it is safe and 
operating as intended. 
In the early 2000’s, that paradigm was upended by the concept of malicious 
hardware embedded into a chip at the time of manufacturing [1].  These hardware 
Trojans, as they came to be known, became possible through the globalization of the 
microchip industry.  As the semiconductor technology became smaller and smaller the 
cost of fabrication facilities became just that much greater.  Only the largest 
manufacturers could continue to operate and maintain modern facilities.  This forced 
most chip designers to outsource their designs to other, cheaper, countries.  To 
manufacture a chip, the complete design must be sent to the fabrication facility, usually in 
a standard GDSII file format. The chip manufacturer then has an opportunity to alter the 
design to suit their purposes, creating a hardware Trojan.  
Hardware Trojans are generally broken out into two categories: reliability and 




some way or to reduce its useful life [2, 3].  This can mean that the mean time to failure 
(MTTF) is significantly reduced or that data is corrupted in some way, making the final 
output meaningless. Initially the infected chips operate as expected, especially during 
testing.  The Trojan effects are triggered after some long period of time or after a rare 
sequence of events occurs on chip. 
 Data leakage Trojans are more complicated and potentially more damaging.  The 
undetected loss of secret information can be devastating.  These Trojans will not affect 
the normal operation of chips.  Instead, they scan and capture data, such as an encryption 
key, as it is processed, or possibly allow privilege escalation on a CPU [4, 5].   The 
captured data can be leaked out through Wi-Fi [6] or the power emissions could even be 
harnessed [7].  Introduction of a data leaking Trojan is much more complex than a 
reliability Trojan.  The reliability of a chip can be compromised with little understanding 
of the overall function of the design.  Simply reducing some key wire widths so that 
failure occurs prematurely or adding a counter to switch a line to ground will cause a chip 
to fail in the field [2].    Conversely, a data leakage Trojan designer must have a near total 
understanding of the circuit they wish to infect.  Since the data leakage of confidential 
information is so valuable the extra effort is warranted, so are extra defensive measures. 
Data leakage Trojans will be the focus of this dissertation. Unless otherwise noted, 
hardware Trojans will refer to the data leakage type in the following text. 
 
1.2 TROJAN DEFENSES 
Hardware designers can either try to detect the Trojan or prevent it.  Detection of 




Runtime monitoring and post-manufacture testing [8] rely on identifying the differences 
in chip operation introduced by the Trojan circuit.  These methods depend on the tester’s 
ability to trigger the Trojan circuit so the effects of the Trojan can be measured.  Triggers 
are intentionally designed so that testing is unlikely to uncover them, e.g. repeating the 
same instruction hundreds of times.  Once triggered, the effects can be obvious, such as 
circuit malfunction, or can be subtle.  Subtle changes to the chip’s operation can 
sometimes be identified through side channels such as power, temperature, path delay or 
EM emissions.  Runtime monitoring and post manufacture testing usually rely on the 
golden chip concept.  The golden chip requirement is the Achilles heel of these methods.  
Since the designers are outsourcing the design, the only place this chip can come from is 
the same facility that produced the suspect chips in the first place.  Simulations are not 
typically accurate enough to detect subtle changes in side channel measurements. 
A hardware engineer must then try to prevent the attacker from placing the Trojan 
on chip using a Design for Security (DFS) method.  The currently available methods all 
try to accomplish the same goal, which is to prevent the attacker from understanding the 
design.   The idea being that if an attacker cannot understand what the chip is doing or 
how it is laid out then there is no opportunity to find and leak data.  Commonly available 
methods include obfuscation, layout camouflaging and split manufacturing [9].  
Obfuscation aims to make the function of the circuit less obvious by using nonstandard 
designs for common functions. It also includes the technique of logic encryption where 
the data processed or the function performed in a circuit is encrypted [10]. Obfuscation 
can also be performed on state machines in the design, additional states are added leading 




Layout camouflaging attempts to disguise the design by making the layouts of 
each gate indistinguishable from each other.  For example, the layout of a NAND or 
NOR cell can be made to look identical.  Extracting the netlist using image based 
techniques on the layout mask then becomes difficult [11, 12]. 
       Finally, split manufacturing attempts to break up the design into front-end and 
back-end layers.  The front-end consists of the lower silicon layers and first metal layers.  
The back-end being the remaining metal layers [13].  Splitting the fabrication prevents an 
attacker in one location from having access to the complete design.   This can be 
extended to 3D ICs as well since the upper chip can naturally be manufactured 
separately. 
Unfortunately, all three methods have weaknesses.  Obfuscation and layout 
camouflaging can both be deciphered given enough effort and time spent to reverse 
engineer the design files.  Split manufacturing is susceptible when multiple production 
runs are needed. An attacker could exploit industry standards in floorplaning, placement 
and routing to alter one half of the split chip successfully [13] on the first run, or reverse 
engineer a finished chip, which can be obtained through legitimate or illegitimate means, 
and inserting attacks into subsequent production runs which are often needed to meet 
demand [14]. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The research presented in the subsequent papers presents a new paradigm in 
hardware Trojan defense.  Using the following DFS methods to defend against data 




preventing them.  The designers can simply ignore them.  The first paper, RECORD, 
presents a new method of designing a custom ASIC chip for defense.  Randomized 
Encoding of Combinational Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage (RECORD) describes 
how a combinational logic design can be converted to a randomized dual rail circuit.  The 
encoding, in combination with a split manufacturing process called Quilt Packaging [11] 
which splits the chip into secure and insecure portions, prevents an attacker from 
capturing any meaningful data from any outsourced portion of the ASIC design.  The 
RECORD process is effective even if the design is fully known to an attacker and 
maintains its effectiveness through any number of subsequent production runs.  The 
design is generic, allowing it to be used quickly and easily on any existing combinational 
design.  The only costs to the RECORD process are increased area and power, 2.28x-
2.33x and 1.7x-2.24x respectively in sample tests on an Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) Substitution Box (SBox) design.   
The second paper addresses the challenges of utilizing the RECORD process in a 
sequential logic environment.  By importing the RECORD process directly into a 
sequential circuit, new vulnerabilities develop.  Data is now available on multiple clock 
cycles and a clever attacker could infer and decode the randomized dual rail signal.  The 
Sequential RECORD process introduces additional randomness into the dual rail 
encoding along with additional randomness in the assembly of the final chip.  No longer 
will Quilt Packaging be used; instead 3D split manufacturing will take its place.  Careful 
segregation of the circuit components allows the lower tier of the 3D process to be 
interchangeable with a large number of generic upper tiers.  The Sequential RECORD 




permutations available to the designer.  Sequential RECORD is again generic and viable 
across multiple production runs.  The cost is again in increased area and power, 3.75x and 
4.5x respectively, and a slight impact to performance of 3% reduction in slack in a 
sample Data Encryption Standard circuit design. 
The major weaknesses of RECORD and Sequential RECORD are addressed by 
the third paper, namely the increased area and power and the reliance on ASIC designs.  
Many if not most companies today rely on commercial of the shelf (COTS) products, not 
their own custom designs.  RECORD would be useless on a COTS chip as it stands.  To 
adapt the RECORD concepts to COTS chips and to address the high cost of area and 
power, a Time Division Multiplexed (TDM) version of RECORD is introduced for both 
combinational and sequential designs.  It decreases the area overhead of sequential 
RECORD by 63% and power by 56% at the cost of latency which increases by at least 
5x.  The TDM concept is then further refined to show how it can be used to operate a 
COTS product from a second chip.  The second chip could be an FPGA or CPU.  The 
COTS process is then proven out in real hardware which demonstrates the process and 
the RECORD principles.  The cost of the COTS process is in latency which increases by 
3.9x.  The RECORD method and its derivatives represent an entirely new way for both 
the ASIC designer and the COTS integrator to protect their designs free from the worry 





I. PROTECTING INTEGRATED CIRCUITS FROM HARDWARE TROJANS WITH 
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Many companies outsource manufacturing of their chips. Untrustworthy 
manufacturers may add hardware Trojans which cause data leakage. Existing defensive 
methods can be compromised if attackers can physically access the chip. A technique, 
called RECORD (Randomized Encoding of COmbinational Logic for Resistance to Data 
leakage) is proposed which uses Quilt Packaging and data randomization to prevent 
attackers from interpreting data even when data leakage exists. Experiments on a 45 nm 
8-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Substitution Box (Sbox) show RECORD can 
effectively hide information with approximately 2.3x increase in area, 1.7x in dynamic 






The ever-increasing cost of technology scaling has forced many design houses to 
outsource their semiconductor fabrication process to lower cost facilities in other 
countries. Chip manufacturing has become a global enterprise. Outsourcing presents a 
problem when sensitive designs must be surrendered to the manufacturer before 
production.  These manufacturers may not have secure facilities or processes, and their 
trustworthiness remains unknown. The opportunity exists for malicious parties, or 
attackers, to re-engineer the original design and to insert malicious hardware known as 
hardware Trojans.   
       The original functionality of the chip is maintained after Trojan insertion, with 
little to no increase in area or power consumption, making it very difficult to detect the 
attack during testing. At runtime, the Trojans are triggered externally or by a specific 
sequence of internal signals.  
       Trojan circuits generally target reliability or data leakage.  The reliability Trojan 
aims to damage the chip in some way or otherwise make it non-functional [1-2].  These 
Trojans can significantly reduce the mean time to failure (MTTF) or corrupt the data to 
make the final output meaningless. Data leakage Trojans are more complicated and 
potentially more damaging. They will not affect the normal operation of chips. Instead, 
they scan and capture data or give an unauthorized user control of the system, for 
example by leaking an encryption key or allowing privilege escalation [3]. The technique 
proposed in this paper defends against data leakage Trojans.  
       Successful execution of a data leakage Trojan circuit relies on the attacker’s 




analyzing the netlist and layout, or afterwards by reverse-engineering a fabricated chip 
from the open market [4].  Methods of combating hardware Trojans include runtime 
monitoring, post-silicon testing [5] or design for security (DFS) [6].  Runtime monitoring 
and post-silicon testing try to detect abnormal chip behaviors when hardware Trojans are 
triggered. They are ineffective against data leakage Trojans which do not change the 
chip’s behavior. DFS attempts to make it harder for the attacker to understand the design 
through obfuscation, layout camouflaging, and split manufacturing [7]. Obfuscation aims 
to make the function of the circuit less obvious by using nonstandard designs for common 
functions or by adding states to state machines which lead to dead end or black hole 
states [7]. Camouflaging attempts to disguise the design by making the layouts of each 
gate indistinguishable, for example by making a NAND or NOR cell look identical, so 
that extracting the netlist from the layout becomes difficult or impossible [7,8]. Split 
manufacturing attempts to break up the design so that the lower silicon and metal layers 
are manufactured with one company and the remaining metal layers with another [9], 
preventing either fabricator access to complete design information. All three methods can 
be compromised when an attacker procures a fabricated chip and reverse-engineers the 
design. Hardware Trojans can then be designed and injected in the manufacturing 
process. 
       A new technique is proposed which prevents leakage of useful data from an 
established Hardware Trojan. This technique, called RECORD (Randomized Encoding of 
COmbinational Logic for Resistance to Data leakage) [10], uses Dual-rail encoding to 
randomize the information within the chip, and Quilt Packaging [11] to protect a small 




prevents an attacker from interpreting leaked data, even if they have full access to the 
outsourced design and data within the outsourced portion. Simulations of a 45 nm 8-bit 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Substitution Box (Sbox) show that RECORD can 
effectively hide the information being processed while incurring an acceptable increase in 
area, power, and delay.    
       The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dual 
rail randomized encoding with Quilt Packaging for data leakage hardware Trojan 
resistance. Design examples are discussed in Section 3. Concluding remarks are 




2. FRAMEWORK OF RECORD 
The basic framework to randomize the on-chip information in hardware is 
discussed in Section 2.1. The utilization of Quilt Packaging is discussed in Section 2.2. 
The associated vulnerability analysis is revealed in Section 2.3 and the design overhead is 
discussed in Section 2.4.     
 
2.1 RANDOMIZED ENCODING 
The key idea of RECORD is to introduce randomness in information processing. 
To accomplish this, non-overlapping codes are defined for logic values. To allow 
randomness to be introduced, at least two bits (i.e. dual-rail logic) are needed to encode a 
logic zero and logic one. The dual-rail combination 00 and 11 were defined to represent a 
logical zero, and 01 and 10 to represent a one. One of the two rails will be generated from 
a random number generator and will be held in the “secure” section of the chip. This rail 
will be called the random rail. The second rail will contain a value which depends on the 
single-rail logic value and the value on the random rail, and will be available to the inner 
combinational logic. 
       Conversion between the single-rail logic and the corresponding dual-rail logic is 
straightforward. Consider a single-rail binary logic value x. One of the dual rails will be 
given a random logic value r. The other rail will be given a logic value, t, determined 
from x and r as  






One must then know both r and t to determine x: 
x = tÅ r . (2) 
Protecting the data, x, from Hardware Trojans can then be accomplished by preventing 
the attacker from accessing the value r on the random rail.  
A simplistic implementation of the dual-rail approach is shown in Figure 2.1, 
where each single-rail logic gate is replaced with a corresponding dual-rail gate. The 
values of A and B correspond to the values of the data, x, and A1, A2, B1 and B2 
correspond to the associated values of t and r. This dual-rail implementation requires an 






Figure 2.1. (a) A conventional AND gate; (b) The equivalent AND gate based on the 





To reduce overhead while maintaining the randomness needed for security, all the 
gates in a combinational logic block can share the same random rail. Doing so allows use 
of only one random number generator and allows the logic implementation to become 
simpler.   
       With all input signals sharing the same random bit, any Boolean function 
𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … ) with x1, x2, x3 … as Boolean variables can be converted to the 
corresponding dual-rail representation as  
𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … ) → (𝑓(𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, … ) ⊕ 𝑟) 
= (𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟, … ) ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑟) = (𝑔, 𝑟) 
 
(3) 
where the dual-rail output is represented by r and g, where r is the random logic value on 
the common random rail, g is the dual-rail representation of the function output, and 
t1,t2,… are the logic values on the input dual rail corresponding to input signals x1, x2…., 
respectively, i.e., 𝑥𝑖 =  𝑡𝑖 ⊕ 𝑟, i . While calculation of g still seems complicated, it is 
worthwhile to note the following logic equivalency which uses Shannon expansion. 
 
𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟, … ) ⊕ 𝑟 (4) 
 
=  𝑟𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 1, 𝑥2 ⊕ 1, 𝑥3 ⊕ 1, … ) ⊕ 1 + 
?̅?𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 0, 𝑥2 ⊕ 0, 𝑥3 ⊕ 0, … ) ⊕ 0 
= 𝑟𝑓(𝑡1̅, 𝑡2̅,𝑡3̅ … )






The dual-rail output of a function 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … ) can thus be determined from the values 
of inputs t, the random rail r, and the combinational function 𝑓(∙) and can further be 
implemented using a multiplexer (MUX) as shown in Figure 2.2.  
       Such a MUX-based implementation has an area and power overhead of 
approximately 2x compared to the single-rail approach, and applies to any Boolean 
function. In addition to reducing overhead, it has the benefit that the random signal r is 
clearly separated from the rest of the calculation. As long as this signal and the final 
MUX are hidden from the attacker, then the information obtained from any other portion 




Figure 2.2. A MUX-based implementation of randomized dual-rail encoding scheme 
 
 
       RECORD can be implemented in various ways. For example, it is not necessary 
to convert all the inputs to dual-rail.  Changing just the first input, x1, of a function to dual 
rail gives the same effect as converting all the inputs. The corresponding dual-rail 
representation of a function f is as follows 




The first rail can be re-cast as 
 
𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … ) ⊕ 𝑟 = 
𝑟𝑓((𝑥1 ⊕ 1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … ) ⊕ 1 + ?̅?𝑓((𝑥1 ⊕ 0, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … ) ⊕ 0 
(7) 
= 𝑟𝑓(𝑡1̅, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + ?̅?𝑓(𝑡1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … ) (8) 
 
The MUX-based implementation is shown in Figure 2.3. In this figure, only input x1 is 
converted to dual-rail representation (t1, r), and all the remaining inputs are single-rail. 
The output g is also in dual-rail representation with the random rail r, (i.e., the final 
single-rail logic value will be,𝑔 ⊕ r). Compared with the implementation in Figure 2.2, 
this implementation will result in different power and area overhead as shown by the 











       For RECORD to be effective it must protect the random rail r as well as the final 
MUX, such that any data obtained from elsewhere on the chip cannot be directly 
interpreted. So long as this data is protected, the user cannot interpret the data obtained 
from any other part of the circuit. The next section will explain how random rail and 
MUX can be protected from hardware Trojans.  
 
2.2 QUILT PACKAGING  
To determine the meaning of data within the unsecure portion of the IC, the 
attacker must know the value of r. To get this value, a hardware Trojan must monitor the 
values of f and f’ and the output, g, of the MUX in Figures 2.2 or 2.3, so that r can be 
inferred, or must directly monitor the random rail. These values can be protected using 
Quilt Packaging [12-14]. Quilt Packaging allows two dies of different sizes and 
technologies to be fabricated separately and then joined.  The process creates a high-
speed, low-loss connection with measured insertion losses of only 1 dB at 110 GHz and 
2.25dB at 220 GHz [13].  The dies can be attached using several methods including Sn 
immersion plating and pin transfer of solder paste [14].  
       To utilize Quilt Packaging, the RECORD design can be partitioned so that a 
secure area of the chip input/output (I/O) is designed and fabricated separately. The 
secure I/O area includes the random number generator, the XOR gates for conversion 
between single-rail and dual-rail, and the output selection MUXes.  These components 
require a small area relative to the remainder of the design.  The two dies can then be 
combined using Quilt Packaging in a trusted facility. An illustration of the layout 




converted back to single rail using the same random rail r. The random bit would not 
exist anywhere on the outsourced die, thus prohibiting direct monitoring of this bit’s 
value.    
       Consider the fact that these I/O elements are replicated many times for each 
design, once for every input and output bit, and are interchangeable between designs.  It 
is then possible to pre-fabricate them as standardized circuits in a secure facility for 
universal applications (as long as the locations of the I/O’s are pre-defined as a standard). 
Figure 2.5, shows an example layout.  The random number generator is shown in red, as 
is the random rail. Note that these modules and the layout pattern are independent of the 
combinational function being implemented, or the number of inputs that are converted to 
dual-rail. RECORD envisions that these circuits would just need to be fabricated once for 
many different designs. For instance, the design in Figure 2.4 can now be generated by 










2.3 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
RECORD was developed to eliminate vulnerabilities that might occur when an 
attacker adds a hardware Trojans to a chip for the purpose of leaking privileged 
information from the IC in the final product.  RECORD protects against such Trojan’s by 
ensuring the outsourced chip is never given information about the random bit. The 
random rail and the random number generators are pre-fabricated for universal 
applications and incorporated into the outsourced design through Quilt Packaging. The 
attacker has no access to the random data. They will only see the “randomized” inputs, ti, 
and that the outsourced portion of the chip yields two outputs, f and f’. The attacker will 
know that one of the outputs is correct, but will not know which. Simply choosing one of 
the outputs f or f' at random would not generate any meaningful results.  To decode the 
output, which is itself a dual rail signal, the chosen signal would need to be XOR'd 
against the inaccessible random bit.  
 
Figure 2.5. Example of Quilt Packaging Layout.  The random number generator and 
random rail are shown in red. The center core can be safely outsourced.  The smaller dies 




       While RECORD does not allow the outsourced chip access to information about 
the random bit, and thus prevents an attacker from identifying useful information within 
the outsourced design, there are other side channels that might assist attackers in 
obtaining protected information. One important type of side channel attacks is the power 
analysis attack, including differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power 
analysis (CPA) [15-16]. These methods rely on the subtle power difference between a 0 
to 1 transition and a 1 to 0 transition of a logic gate, and allow an attacker to guess the 
data operated on within the IC.  
RECORD is naturally resistant to DPA or CPA attacks, since it uses a dual-rail 
encoding scheme with uniform switching, which hides asymmetries in data processing. 
The power usage difference between data input patterns in a RECORD design is much 
smaller than in a conventional design so that a stronger resistance to power analysis 
attacks can be achieved. Specifically, through randomized encoding (i.e., with 0 being 
coded as 00 and 11, and 1 being coded as 10 and 01, each with equal probability), the 
number of wires with a 01 or a 10 switching in the entire circuit is nearly identical, 
regardless of the number of logic blocks with a true or false output. The total power 
consumption reveals little to no information about the processed data.  
 
2.4 OVERHEAD ANALYSIS  
The protections afforded by RECORD comes at the cost of an approximately 2x 
overhead in power and area as each function must be implemented twice, and there are 
additional costs associated with Quilt Packaging. More accurate data is reported in 




the conversion between single-rail and dual-rail representations. As should be expected, 
as the size of the design increases, the overhead will get closer to 2x as the number of 
components in the protected portion of the design become small compared with the 
overall design. A 2x overhead is still smaller than many of the existing techniques for 
reliability enhancement, such as the triple modular redundancy (TMR) [17], and is a cost 
that should be expected to achieve enhanced security.  A 2x overhead should be 
acceptable for many security applications, where concerns about area and power are 
usually secondary to the need for trusted hardware.  
       In addition to power and area, there is also some overhead due to added 
processing delays. There is minimal difference in the timing of the combinational logic 
required by the two rails compared to the timing in the original design. Additional delay 
may be introduced by the inverters that generate the dual-rail inputs and the MUXes at 
the output, but the added delay should be small compared with the delay of the overall 





3. DESIGN EXAMPLES 
To demonstrate the capabilities and overhead associated with RECORD in real 
designs, an 8-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Substitution Box (Sbox) was 
implemented with RECORD. The AES Sbox was implemented with the same structure as 
described in [18]. The random bit is generated using a Linear Feedback Shift Register 
(LFSR) [19], though any valid random number generator would work equally well. The 
design was synthesized using the FreePDK 45 nm process [20] and Cadence Encounter 
RTL Compiler v.13.10 to obtain power, area and timing data. One example was then laid 
out using Cadence Encounter RTL to GDSII v.13.23.  
       As an illustration of functionality, for RECORD with two inputs converted to dual 
rail, Figures 3.1 - 3.6 show a series of waveforms for the AES Sbox design.  Figure 3.1 
shows output bit 3, chosen at random, from the standard AES Sbox. Figure 3.2 shows a 
randomly selected internal signal from RECORD design. The Figure 3.3 waveform 
shows the corresponding internal signal from the duplicated function block, F’, of the 
RECORD design. Note the waveforms in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 are not equal as 
expected, and even if the values in the two waveforms were identical, it is not possible to 
infer the corresponding logic value unless the random bit is known. Figure 3.4 and 3.5 
show the third output bits from each of the two function blocks, F and F’.  These are still 
encoded with the random bit.  Finally, Figure 3.6 shows the final bit 3 output of the 














Figure 3.3.  Same internal signal as in Figure 8b but from second function block, F’, of 













Figure 3.6.  Top waveform is a repeat of 8a, standard Sbox output bit 3.  Bottom 
waveform is the final output bit 3 from a RECORD Sbox 
 
   
       Since a designer has the option to choose which inputs are converted to dual rail 
there are 256 possible designs for the 8-bit AES Sbox.  All 256 possibilities have been 
implemented for comparison of power, area and delay.  The increase in total area is 
shown in Figure 3.7.  This figure displays the area for each of the 256 possible design 
variations sorted by the number of bits converted to dual rail.  First one bit then two and 
so on until all bits are converted to dual rail.  As expected the area slowly increases as 
more bits are converted to dual rail, with the most area efficient designs using only one 
input converted to dual rail and the designs using the most area converting all bits to 
dual-rail.  It is important to note, however, that there is only a 2% difference between the 




to dual rail, shows a 2.28x increase in area over the standard non-RECORD sbox.  
Whereas converting all inputs to dual rail shows only 2.33x area increase. The 
differences in area result primarily from the added inverters at the inputs and MUXs at 




Figure 3.7. Layout area for each possible input dual rail combination, sorted by number 
of bits converted to dual rail 
 
 
       Figure 3.8 shows the leakage power for all combinations of converted bits, sorted 
in the same manner as Figure 3.7.  A 2.3x increase in leakage power is shown for three of 
the design options: when bits (7,5,4,3,2), bits (7,5,2,1,0) and bits (5,4,3,2,0) are converted 
to dual rail.  These combinations represent the smallest increase in leakage power.  The 
largest increase in leakage power (2.34x) is found when bits (7,6,5,4,2) are converted to 
dual rail. Interestingly, both the least and largest increases are found with five bits 
converted to dual rail.  Figure 3.9 shows a similar plot for dynamic power.  The least 
dynamic power increase (1.7x) is found when bits (7,6,5,4,2) are converted which is also 


























is found for the design option where bits (7,6,4,0) are converted.  Finally, Figure 3.10 
shows the increase in critical path delay for each design option organized as in the 
previous tables. The standard Sbox delay was found to be 2.3 us. The delay increases by 
only 1.06x or 137ps for the option where bits (7,5,2) are converted to dual rail and by 





Figure 3.8. Leakage power for each possible input dual rail combination, sorted by 




Figure 3.9. Dynamic power for each possible input dual rail combination, sorted by 
number of bits converted to dual rail 
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Figure 3.10. Increase in critical path delay for each possible input dual rail combination, 
sorted by number of bits converted to dual rail 
 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of RECORD overhead impact 
 Area, µm
2 
Dynamic, nW Leakage, nW Delay, ps 
Baseline 788 115169 4305 2311 
RECORD 
Overhead 
2.28x-2.33x 1.7x-2.24x 2.3x-2.34x .06x-.12x 
 
 
It is also worthwhile to point out that since the different dual rail options are all 
equally secure. The Quilt Packaging process and the pre-fabricated I/O modules allow the 
individual final chips to be assembled differently each time.  For example, the first chip 
could have the first input bit converted and the next could have all input bits converted 
and so on.  Thus preventing any reverse engineering attempts from being successful  and 
greatly frustrating any potential attacker. 
2Bits 3Bits 4Bits 


















Figure 3.11 shows an example layout of the RECORD design with all inputs 
converted to dual-rail. We only demonstrate the portion that can be outsourced (i.e., the 









4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A novel scheme was proposed to prevent attackers from interpreting leaked data from 
hardware Trojans by randomizing data within outsourced combinational logic and 
providing “secure” chip areas with the aid of Quilt Packaging. Simulation results on a 45 
nm 8-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Substitution Box (Sbox) showed that 
RECORD can randomize information and separate the dual rail encoding/decoding with a 
2.28x-2.33x increase in area, a 1.7x-2.24x increase in dynamic power and an 1.06x-1.12x 
increase in delay. This overhead can be considered necessary to achieve enhanced 
security in sensitive applications. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first 
circuit-level technique that can resist data leakage after hardware Trojans are established. 
The technique is particularly suitable for secure designs with multiple fabrication runs 
[21].  
      Experiments were conducted in the AES design to demonstrate the impact of 
converting 1 or all 8 bits of the design to dual-rail, or any combination in between. For 
this logic circuit, there was negligible difference among the area, power usage, or delay 
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Globalization of micro-chip fabrication has opened a new avenue of cyber-crime. 
It is now possible to insert hardware Trojans directly into the chip during the 
manufacturing process.  These hardware Trojans are capable of destroying a chip, 
reducing performance or even capturing sensitive data.  This paper presents a 
modification to a recently presented method of Trojan defense known as RECORD: 
Randomized Encoding of COmbinational Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage. 
RECORD aims to prevent data leakage through a randomized encoding and split 
manufacturing scheme.  Its weakness, however, it that it is only applicable to 
combinational circuits.  Sequential RECORD proposes a method to extend RECORD 
concepts to sequential designs.  Experimental work with Sequential RECORD on a Data 
Encryption Standard circuit show that it is effective with the cost of a 3.75x area 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
       Since the turn of the century many IC design houses have outsourced the 
production of their chips to other countries [1].  This has created a new opening for 
cyber-attacks. When a firm sends out a sensitive design to be manufactured overseas, the 
trustworthiness of the manufactured IC can no longer be guaranteed.  Hardware Trojans 
can be injected into the netlist or the layout altered to perform a variety of malicious 
activities.  There are generally two types of hardware Trojans: reliability Trojans that stop 
the chip from functioning or data capture Trojans that capture the data being processed by 
the chip [2].  A reliability hardware Trojan is placed on chip with the goal of damaging 
the chip at some later, unexpected, date.  For example, adding a simple circuit to increase 
power consumption [3] rendering the system un-usable in the field or a counter that 
counts down to switching the whole circuit off [4].     
 After fabrication, the Trojan circuit remains dormant during testing.  The Trojan 
is usually very small relative to the remaining logic and therefore adds negligibly to the 
area and power consumption of the final circuit while dormant.  Current methods of 
detecting hardware Trojans after production involve runtime monitoring and post-
manufacture testing [5]. Runtime monitoring and post-manufacture testing rely on 
identifying the differences in chip operation introduced by the Trojan circuit.  These 
methods depend on the tester’s ability to trigger the Trojan circuit so the effects of the 
Trojan can be measured.  The effects can be obvious, such as circuit malfunction, or 
subtle.  Subtle changes to the chip’s operation can sometimes be identified through side 
channels such as power, temperature, path delay or EM emissions.  Runtime monitoring 




requirement is the Achilles heel of these methods.  The only place this chip can come 
from is the same facility that produced the suspect chips in the first place.  Simulations 
are not typically accurate enough to detect subtle changes in side channel measurements. 
Because of this problem design for security (DFS) [6] methods are more reliable. 
For a data leakage Trojan to be successful the attacker needs to understand, at a 
minimum, the logic that is being monitored.  This information can be gleaned from the 
netlist and layout or by obtaining a finished chip from a previous production run and 
reverse engineering it [7]. These types of Trojans can leak sensitive encryption keys out 
through Wi-Fi [8] or even through the power signature itself [9].   Current DFS methods 
try to prevent the attacker from understanding what the circuit is doing through 
obfuscation, layout camouflaging, or split manufacturing [10].  A new method, known as 
the RECORD [11], takes this technique one step further by preventing the attacker from 
understanding the meaning of logic signals. 
 Obfuscation [12], layout camouflaging [10,13] and split manufacturing[14] rely 
on the inability of the attacker to see what has been done to disguise the circuit.  
However, with enough time and effort obfuscation and layout camouflaging can be 
deciphered. Split manufacturing breaks up the design into lowest level silicon and upper 
level metals.  The two pieces are manufactured separately preventing an attacker in one 
location from having access to a complete design.  Split Manufacturing can be overcome 
by exploiting industry standards in floorplaning, placement and routing to alter one half 
of the split chip successfully [14], or reverse engineer a finished chip, which can be 
obtained through legitimate or illegitimate means, and inserting attacks into subsequent 




       RECORD is more robust than these techniques since it starts out with the 
assumption that the design is already known to the attacker.   Through the use of a 
randomized dual-rail encoding and careful selection of split manufacturing the RECORD 
process prevents hardware Trojans from directly obtaining meaningful information from 
any part of the protected circuit. 
       Though RECORD is resistant to attacks even after the design is compromised, it 
is only defined for combinational logic.  It is less than ideal for sequential logic designs 
as will be explored in Section 2.  In a sequential circuit, the attacker has access to 
information not available in a combinational design: the information created in previous 
or upcoming clock cycles.  As shown in subsection 2.2 this creates a vulnerability in the 
RECORD process by allowing attackers to infer the random encoding bit. 
       Sequential RECORD is a modification of the basic RECORD design that expands 
the dual rail encoding scheme to use two random bits that can change independently on 
each clock cycle. A change to the split manufacturing scheme that makes use of 3D IC 
technology is also proposed.  These new techniques increase the difficulty to decode the 
dual rail encoding and allow the RECORD concept to be used successfully in a sequential 
design.  The effectiveness of the Sequential RECORD method is demonstrated by 
implementing it in a Data Encryption Standard (DES) circuit. The technique requires a 
3.75x area overhead and 4.5x power overhead and caused a 3% impact on performance. 
       The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a short 
review of the RECORD design process.  Subsection 2.2 discusses the challenges of 




Section 3 describes the Sequential RECORD process in detail.  Section 4 presents a 
design example using a Data Encryption Standard circuit. Conclusions are presented in 







2.  BACKGROUND 
2.1 BACKGROUND OF RECORD 
 With a RECORD design the opponent must still decipher the design as with all 
the DFS methods.  However RECORD makes the assumption that this will be successful 
and adds additional protection which knowledge of the circuit design does not overcome. 
 A chip designed using RECORD uses a combination of split manufacturing and 
randomized dual-rail signaling to foil attackers.  As seen in Figure 2.1, the outer ring is 
composed of prefabricated modules that perform the dual-rail conversion and generate a 
random signal. Since these sections are prefabricated (possibly years in advance) and 
later attached to the outsourced logic, they are inaccessible to an attacker at the time of 









       Within these pre-fabricated I/O blocks the signals are converted to dual rail 
signals and back to single rail at the output.  Conversion is done by XORing the input bit, 
x, with a randomly generated signal, r, which then becomes the second bit of the dual rail 
signal, t, as shown in (1).   
t x r   (1) 
This bit, r, randomly changes each time the chip is activated.  The dual rail signals 
represent a logic 0 as either 00 or 11. Logic 1 can be represented as either 01 or 10. 
 The two bits are represented by t & r in (1).  The original input value, x, is 
dropped.  Note that the second bit, r, of the dual-rail signal is always the random signal 
bit.  This bit is never routed outside of the I/O blocks.  Only the first bit, t, of the new 




Figure 2.2. Conversion of  input data to dual rail 
 
 
 The internal combinational logic needs to be altered to accommodate the dual-rail 
signaling.  Any combinational function f can be converted to a dual rail function using 
(2). 
 




Further manipulations using Boolean algebra show that a dual rail encoded function can 
be represented as in (3). 
 
𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟, … ) ⊕ 𝑟 = 𝑟𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 1, 𝑥2 ⊕ 1, 𝑥3 ⊕ 1 … ) ⊕
1 +   ?̅?𝑓((𝑥1 ⊕ 0, 𝑥2 ⊕ 0, 𝑥3 ⊕ 0 … ) ⊕ 0  
(3) 
 
 = 𝑟𝑓(𝑡1̅, 𝑡2̅,𝑡3̅ … )
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + ?̅?𝑓(𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3 … ) (4) 
 
The result of these manipulations is that the combinational function is duplicated and 
multiplexed with the random bit, r, used as a select signal. Each functional block is then 
sent only the first rail, t, of any dual-rail converted input bits.  Never the second rail, r.  










These two outputs are then routed back to the outer I/O modules where they are 
re-joined by the random bit, r.  The two outputs are de- muxed using the random bit as a 
select signal to create output, g, which is itself in dual rail encoding with, r.  Finally, g is 
converted back to single rail with another XOR gate before being routed off chip.  The 
attacker is then presented with a design that is only ever routed with half of a randomly 
generated dual-rail data signal which is meaningless without the random bit. The random 
bit does not exist in the outsourced portion of the design.  For a more detailed explanation 
of RECORD see [7]. 
 
2.2 MOTIVATION FOR SEQUENTIAL RECORD 
 The RECORD design scheme adds an unprecedented protection layer beyond 
traditional DFS, since it assumes that the attacker has already broken the first line of 
defense. The first line being simply understanding the design.  After an attacker deciphers 
a RECORD design, they are presented with two outputs, f and f’, each of which is a dual 
rail encoded signal.  The attacker does not have any way of determining which should be 
chosen since both combinational blocks are identical.  Neither does the attacker know 
what the random bit value is, which is required to decode the final output.  Additionally, 
these choices change randomly each time the circuit is activated and each chip need not 
be assembled identically. 
 If RECORD were used directly in a sequential design, however, the attacker 
would then have additional information: the two outputs, f and f’, and now a returning 




random bit value and decode the signals on any line.  This concept is discussed in detail 
in Section 3.2. 
 Furthermore, RECORD does not discuss what is to be done with the random bit 
on each clock transition.  Should it be stored or allowed to change? If stored, then control 
logic would be required.  RECORD is a generic design scheme that can be used 
indiscriminately on any combinational design.  It is desirable to maintain generality in 
Sequential RECORD. Control logic would destroy this generality. 
       Sequential RECORD expands on RECORD by allowing the random bit to change 
on each clock and by adding a second random bit to overcome the vulnerability 





3. FRAMEWORK OF SEQUENTIAL RECORD 
3.1 HANDLING THE RANDOM BIT CHANGES 
       RECORD does not discuss what to do with the random bit, r, on subsequent clock 
cycles.  There are two options, store it or allow it to change independently.  If the 
designer was to extend RECORD directly to sequential designs without altering the 
RECORD method, the entire sequential design would be duplicated (registers and 
combinational logic) just as the combinational function, F, in RECORD.   Only one rail 
of the dual rail signal would be stored in the registers on each clock cycle. The random 
bit would then need to remain the same on the next cycle for the dual rail signal to still be 
valid.  Storing the random bit also implies additional control logic.  
       Imagine a simple pipeline.  Each set of data would have its own random bit which 
would need to be stored and then recalled at the appropriate time to decode the correct 
output from the pipeline.  Not only does storing the random bit add area to the pre-
fabricated I/O blocks but it also hinders the pre-fabrication process. The control logic 
would not be universal but would need to be customized to properly correlate to each 
circuit. The plug and play generality of RECORD would be lost. 
 Sequential RECORD allows the random bit to change independently and 
randomly on each clock and allows the I/O logic to remain simple and independent of the 
sequential logic.  To accomplish this independence, when the random second rail 
changes, the data stored in the registers will be evaluated and updated to the new random 




To simplify the design only the intermediate combinational logic, seen in Figure 
3.1, is duplicated, as in RECORD.  Then only a single, shared, set of registers is required.  
The outputs of the duplicated combinational logic blocks are de-muxed, see Figure 3.2. 
 
 




Figure 3.2. Logic needed to keep the dual rail signal in synch with the random bit  
 
 
       Demuxing is done on each clock instead of only at completion of the calculation.  
The de-muxed output is then stored in the shared set of registers.  On the next clock the 




whether the random bit has switched or not.  This update signal is the XOR of the current 
clock cycle’s random bit, r(t), and the previous clock cycles random bit, r(t-1), see (5).  
 
( ) ( 1)update r t r t    (5) 
 
The update process requires one additional register added to the pre-fabricated I/O to 
store one random bit from the previous cycle.   
If the design is laid out as specified in RECORD then each register would need to 
be prefabricated as an I/O block and quilted to the outsourced core.  This would quickly 
overwhelm the Quilt Packaging process, since it is limited to the perimeter of the core.  
Imagine a core limited design as opposed to a pad limited design. In order to keep the 
random bit, r, secure, we need to modify the split manufacturing process.   Instead of 
using Quilt Packaging to combine the secure and insecure portions of the chip, Sequential 
RECORD uses a secure top tier and 3D manufacturing to combine the two tiers using 
Through Silicon Vias (TSVs) [18].   The split manufacturing will be discussed further in 
Section 3.3.  
 
3.2  A SECOND RANDOM BIT 
 The design can now be segregated as in RECORD keeping the random second rail 
confined to the upper tier of a 3D IC process.  The attacker must now try to infer the 
random bit with the information available in the outsourced lower tier, as there would be 




RECORD, an inserted Trojan can monitor the signals passed between tiers, f, f’ and 
g(t+1). It would then be possible to infer the random bit under certain conditions. 
 
– If f(t)=f’(t), and g(t+1)=f(t), then r has not flipped from cycle t to cycle t+1 
– If f(t)=f’(t), and g(t+1)=  ,  then r has flipped from cycle t to cycle t+1 
– If f(t)=  , and g(t+1)=f(t), then r(t+1)=1 
– If f(t)=   , and g(t+1)= , then r(t+1)=0 
 
Using these criteria an attacker could discover the random bit and keep track of its 
changes cycle to cycle.  Once the random bit is discovered the entire scheme fails.  
  The solution is to use an additional random bit.  Using the concepts presented in 
(2)-(4), the following solution can be obtained for adding a second random bit, r2, to a 
function, f , see (6). 
 
𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 … ) → 𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟1, 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟2, 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟1 … ) ⊕ 𝑟1 (6) 
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In this new implementation r1 and r2 are independently switching random numbers.  As 
seen in (7) the two random bit implementation can be represented as four identical 








1 2 3 4 1(t , t , t , t ...) Ff f   
1 2 3 4 2' (t , , t , ...) Ff f t t   
1 2 3 4 3'' ( , t , , t ...) Ff f t t   
1 2 3 4 4''' ( , , , ...) Ff f t t t t   
Figure 3.3.  Input vectors for each intermediate combinational block 
 
       Some of the inputs will refer to r1 and some will refer to r2, the exact combination 
can be changed but here we have set half to refer to r1 and the other half to r2.  The 
intermediate outputs will refer to just one of the random bits. Here we have chosen r1 but 
it could just as easily be r2, as determined by the physical wiring of the 4-1 multiplexer.  
Figure 3.4 shows how (7) could be implemented in hardware.  The combinational logic 
functions F1-4, are de-muxed using the two random bits r1 and r2 as select signals before 
being stored in a register. This allows the stored signal to be re-indexed against a new 
random bit in the next clock cycle. 
  
 





       The new upper tier design is shown in Figure 3.5.  To re-index each bit before it is 
sent back to the lower tier, the bit must be XOR’d with  one of two update signals based 
on random bit r1(t+1) or r2(t+1).  For example, if bit 5 of the input signal was paired with r2, 
bit 5 of the intermediate output vector is then referenced to r1, due to wiring of the 
multiplexer. When bit 5 is read out of the register on the next clock cycle it must be re-
indexed since the random bit may or may not have changed.  It may be re-indexed against 




Figure 3.5. Upper tier for two random bit implementation 
 
 
3.3  SPLIT MANUFACTURING 
       As discussed in Section 3.1, the split manufacturing for Sequential RECORD will 
be performed using a 3D process with a lower, outsourced, die and an upper, secure, die 
joined using TSV, see Figure 3.6.  The upper tier will include all of the components 
previously included in the prefabricated blocks used in RECORD: random bit generator, 




upper tier will now also include all of the components found in Figure 3.5, including 4-1 
multiplexers, registers and an additional random bit generator. 
 
 
        
Figure 3.6.  Conceptual data flow diagram for Sequential RECORD. Showing how data 
flows between the two layers  
 
 
 The upper tier can be prefabricated in an array structure as seen in Figure 3.7, 
where each block in the figure contains the components of Figure 3.5: the multiplexor, 
register and XOR gate needed for the dual rail design.  Not all the top structures need be 
identical. Several variations could be used to obfuscate the design and frustrate the 
attacker.  Possibilities include switching the dependence of the output bits from r1 to r2, 





Figure 3.7. Array structure of pre-fabricated top tier 
 
 
       A possible layout for these standard register blocks is shown in Figure 3.8.  This 
layout uses 45 nm technology standard cells.  Each TSV is 1 µm in diameter and the total 










3.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
       Looking at the possible input/output scenarios using the same methodology 
described in Section 3.2 to determine if the random bit can be inferred, see Table 3.1.  By 
including a second random bit the number of possible output combinations has 
quadrupled and reduced the number of scenarios for direct random bit inference to 25%. 
Table 3.2 shows similar results for outputs referred to r2. 
 
Table 3.1. Possible input/output combinations and potential for discovery of r1 and r2 




Table 3.2. Possible input/output combinations and potential for discovery of r1 and r2 







       Using the scenarios in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, an attacker could determine the random 
bit in four scenarios.  However, these tables assume several things.  First the attacker 
must know which physical logic block is which, F1, F2, F3 and F4.  As can be seen from 
the tables, the order matters.  The attacker must also know which bit the intermediate 
outputs are being referenced to prior to being stored in the registers.  This can be either r1 
or r2, and is easily changed by re-wiring the select signals on the multiplexers.  Finally 
the attacker must know which bit the returning signal g(t+1) is referenced to. 
 Since the entire register block is located on a secure upper tier, each upper layer 
could be different. For each register block there are 96 different permutations of input 
wiring and output references. the same lower insecure wafer could be bonded to any 
number of different possible upper layers, indiscriminately. Conversely, the upper tiers 
can be used for any lower tier design allowing bulk manufacturing of the upper tier for 
cost savings.  
A different inference table is needed for each possibility and there is no way for 
an attacker to know which table is needed for any given chip. The possible number of 
upper tier variations is limited only by the number of registers in the total design and the 
fabrication cost of an upper tier. Only a small number of upper tier variations need 
actually be manufactured.  The attacker would not know which ones and would need to 





4. DESIGN RESULTS 
To demonstrate the performance of Sequential RECORD, a 64 bit Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) design was implemented using this technique [19]. The 
baseline design was implemented in VHDL and synthesized using a 45 nm process with 
Cadence Encounter RTL Compiler v.13.10.  The Sequential RECORD modifications 
were performed directly to the synthesized Verilog netlist of the baseline code.  
Encounter RTL Compiler provided the power and timing slack analysis. Both designs 
were then laid out using Cadence Encounter RTL to GDSII v.13.23, where the areas of 
the designs were measured.    
       The Sequential RECORD design method was synthesized and a full layout 
performed. The layout is shown in Figure 4.1.  The area of the core was 3.75x larger than 
the baseline DES design.  At first glance it might be assumed that the area overhead 
should be closer to four times, given the four times duplication of the logic blocks, 
however recall that the registers are not duplicated in the Sequential RECORD design 
process. The simulation results are summarized in Table 4.1.  Dynamic power increased 
4.5x, 3.1x for leakage and 4.5x overall.  A timing analysis was performed at 31 MHz.  
The clock speed was chosen based on the clock speed given in the DES datasheet [19].  
The slack was reduced by only 3% due to Sequential RECORD.   This overhead may 
seem excessive but consider the use of triple modular redundancy (TMR) which carries 
3x area overhead and is a common design method used to increase reliability [20]. The 
extra 0.75x  area increase over TMR is a small price to pay for added security. 
       Also, note that the dual rail layout values include area for unnecessary 




of the DES design there is a 64 bit input word that is held in the first bank of registers.  
These register values are not operated on in subsequent clock cycles and therefore do not 
need to be multiplexed and referenced back to a random bit as seen in Figure 3.5.  The 
synthesizer recognized that the multiplexers and XOR gates were not used and deleted 
them.  Since we are pre-fabricating the top layer these extra components would be 
present and would contribute area overhead.  The area was manually added back into the 
numbers you see in the table. 
       Comparing Sequential RECORD to RECORD we see that Sequential RECORD 
increases the area overhead over baseline from 2.3x to 3.75x or 63%.  Power overhead 
similarly increases from 2.8x to 4.5x or 61%. 
 





































 We have presented Sequential RECORD, an extension to the RECORD design 
process to protect hardware from data leakage induced by insertion of hardware Trojans.  
Sequential RECORD extends the basic principles of RECORD, random dual-rail 
signaling and split manufacturing, to sequential designs.  This is done with the addition of 
a second random bit and a move from Quilt Packaging to 3D manufacturing.  
Experimental design analysis utilizing a DES circuit as a baseline yielded a 3.75x area 
overhead and 4.5x power overhead.  The timing slack was reduced only 3% from 
baseline by the addition of the Sequential RECORD components.  Sequential RECORD 
maintains the random signaling of RECORD and its generic plug and play design 
method.  Sequential RECORD also greatly increases the number of design variations 
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Globalization of micro-chip fabrication has opened a new avenue of cyber-crime. 
It is now possible to insert hardware Trojans directly into a chip during the manufacturing 
process.  To date, defensive methods have focused on detection of the Trojan circuitry or 
prevention through design for security methods.  One recent DFS method has attempted 
to shift the focus from prevention and detection by creating ASICs that are inherently 
secure and require no testing to detect Trojans.  Randomized Encoding of Combinational 
Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage (RECORD) and its Sequential logic variant, 
present processes that can prevent hardware Trojans from leaking meaningful 
information even when the entire design is known to the attacker.  Both of these methods 
have significant area and power overhead, apx. 4x area and 4.5x power for the sequential 
version.  In this paper, the fundamental ideas of RECORD are re-imagined to create a 
Time Division Multiplexed version of the RECORD design process which reduces area 
overhead by 63% and power by 56%.  This TDM concept is further refined to allow 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) products and IP cores to be safely operated from a 
separate chip.   These new methods trade off latency (5.3x for TDM and 3.9x for COTS) 
and energy use to accomplish the area and power savings and achieve greater security 





       Detection and prevention of hardware Trojan attacks has become a major concern 
for any company wishing to outsource its hardware manufacturing.  The threat that a 
hardware Trojan could lie dormant on a new chip for years before crippling it, is a very 
real one.  These Trojans could also steal encryption keys, passwords or other sensitive 
information, compromising the entire enterprise.  These data leakage Trojans can leak 
secret information out through Wi-Fi [1] or even through the power signature itself [2].  
Detecting hardware Trojans has proven very difficult if not impossible.  Some Trojans 
have been demonstrated to successfully operate with as little as five transistors [3].  Most 
current methods of defense would be ineffective against such an attack.   Of course this 
problem extends beyond custom ASIC designs and the firms creating them.  Most 
companies buy commercial chips and are in no way involved in the design and 
production processes.  Protecting a Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) chip has so far 
been a mostly un-explored area of hardware Trojan defense methods. 
       Current methods of detecting hardware Trojans after production involve runtime 
monitoring and post-manufacture testing [4].   Runtime monitoring and post-manufacture 
testing rely on identifying the differences in chip operation introduced by the Trojan 
circuit.  These methods depend on the tester’s ability to trigger the Trojan circuit so the 
effects of the Trojan can be measured.   In order for runtime monitoring and post-
manufacture testing to work a golden chip is usually needed so that there is something to 
compare the manufactured chip to.   Simulation of the chip functionality is generally not 
accurate enough to show the very small changes introduced by the additional Trojan 




broad categories would be relevant for a third party company buying the chip 
commercially.   
      A more reliable method of protection is to design the chip for security from the 
beginning.  The concept of Design For Security (DFS) encompasses many possible ideas 
and methods; Obfuscation[5,6], Layout Camouflaging[5,7], and Split Manufacturing[5,8] 
for example.  However, obfuscation and layout camouflaging are both susceptible to 
reverse engineering [9] given enough time and effort.  Split manufacturing is susceptible 
if multiple fabrication runs are used, which is often the case [10].  This paper focuses on 
a new DFS method known as RECORD (Randomized Encoding of Combinational Logic 
for Resistance to Data Leakage) [11]  and more specifically the Sequential RECORD 
variant [12] which can protect sensitive information from being leaked even when the full 
design is known to the attacker and multiple fabrication runs are needed.   
       Sequential RECORD took the initial concept of RECORD, which was only 
specified for combinational logic, and extended it to sequential circuits.  The general idea 
uses two randomly generated numbers to temporarily encode incoming data into a dual 
rail signal.  Wherein, the random numbers represent one of the rails.  Through Boolean 
manipulation combined with split manufacturing, the Sequential RECORD process is 
able to effectively prevent any data leakage Trojans from capturing meaningful data from 
anywhere on the chip.  This process does not try to detect or even prevent hardware 
Trojans on the chip.  There is no longer any need.  Any data captured by the attacks 
would be meaningless.   
      The Sequential RECORD process suffers from two drawbacks.  First the 




since it is a DFS method it must be designed into the chip from the start making it useless 
for COTS applications.  In this paper two modifications to the RECORD process are 
presented.  The first, Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) RECORD, will show how the 
RECORD process can be modified to reduce the area and power overhead by 63% and 
56%, respectively, at the expense of only processing time and total energy used.   
Secondly, a scheme to use the RECORD concepts off chip to allow safe operation of 
COTS products is presented.  This method is shown to work effectively without 
modification of the COTS product and can be implemented on an FPGA or other 
processor which may already be present in the design with approximately 4x increase in 
processing time. 
       The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows.  Section 2 includes a discussion 
of the Sequential RECORD design process.  Section 3 describes the TDM RECORD 
modified process.  Section 4 shows how RECORD concepts can be used to safely operate 






2. BACKGROUND OF SEQUENTIAL RECORD 
The Sequential RECORD design process is itself a modification of the initial 
RECORD design process which allows the concepts to be used successfully on sequential 
designs.  For a full discussion of the RECORD process see [11].   
The first step in the Sequential RECORD process is to create dual rail 
representations of the incoming data vectors.  The conversion is done by XORing the 
input bits, x, with one of two randomly generated signals, r1 & r2, which then becomes 
the second bit of the dual rail signal,t, as shown in (1).  The exact order of which bit is 
XOR’d with which random signal is up to the designer and can be changed chip to chip. 
 
𝑡 = 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑟1  or  𝑡 = 𝑥 ⊕  𝑟2 (1) 
 
The bits ,r1 & r2, randomly change on each clock.  The dual rail signals represent logic 0 
as either 00 or 11. Logic 1 can be represented as either 01 or 10.  The two bits are 
represented by t & r in (1).  The original input value, x, is dropped.  Note that the second 
bit, r, of the dual-rail signal is always the random signal bit.  This bit is never routed to 
the sequential logic.  Only the first bit, t, of the new dual-rail inputs is ever routed to the 








       The new input, t, vectors are routed to the logic according to the following 
equations.  Equation 2 shows how the original function f can be converted to dual rail 
with two random bits, r1 & r2. Equation 3, shows how the concept can be implemented in 
real hardware after some simple Boolean manipulation. 
 
𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 … ) → 𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟1, 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟2, 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟1 … ) ⊕ 𝑟1 (2) 
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       Equation 3, describes four identical functions each being sent a slightly altered 
version of the same input vector.  The two random bits are used as select signals to 
demux the four outputs and select the correct output.  Note that the output selected by the 
de-muxing process is still in dual rail representation, with r1 in this case. The second 
random bit could be used instead with simple reworking of the equations.  Figure 2.2 
shows what these equations would look like in hardware. 
 




       Since the random bits are allows to change independently on each clock cycle a 
method to keep track of the changes and update the, t, signals accordingly is needed.  
First, it can be seen in Figure 2.2 that the registers are not duplicated only the 
intermediate logic.  The intermediate logic ouputs are de-muxed according to (3) and the 
output stored as normal in the register.  On the next clock cycle the output is read out and 
the re-indexed against one of the two random bit signals.  Since the output of the register 
is already in a dual rail representation with r1, the r1(t-1) signal is needed to create an 
update signal, (4).  The new value, g, can be indexed against either random bit at the 
designers discretion before being sent on to the next set of four intermediate logic blocks, 
see Figure 2.3. 
 










       The last major step in the Sequential RECORD process is to segregate the design 
into an upper and lower tier for 3D manufacturing.  This is done to keep the random bits 
secret and to allow for multiple variations of the same chip to be produced 
simultaneously.   The contents of Figure 2.3, are placed on the upper tier along with the 
random bit generator/s.  Figure 2.3 can now be referred to as a register block which can 
be laid out in an array structure, Figure 2.4.  The upper tier is then connected with 
Through Silicon Vias (TSV) to the lower tier.  The lower tier contains only the four 
copies of all the intermediate logic.  This lower tier can now be outsourced.  The upper 
tier is generic.  These register blocks are compatible with any design as long as there are 
enough registers.  The upper tier should be pre-fabricated so that the exact logic it will be 
bonded with is unknown and it should be done in a secure environment or at the very 
least a totally unaffiliated facility than the lower tier.  Not all the top structures need be 
identical. Several variations could be used to obfuscate the design and frustrate the 
attacker.  Possibilities include switching the dependence of the output bits from r1 to r2, 
or switching the dependence of the input bits. 
 





      The final fully assembled design is represented by Figure 2.5, which shows the data 




Figure 2.5.  Conceptual data flow diagram for Sequential RECORD. Showing how data 
flows between the two layers 
 
 
       A design prepared using the Sequential RECORD method resists data leakage 
very effectively, however there are a very small percentage of cases in which an attacker 
could de-code the design with a Trojan placed on the lower tier.  Table 2.1 shows the 
possible combinations of outputs from the lower tier (F1, F2, F3 and F4) and the 
returning input to the lower tier, g, which would allow the attacker to infer the random 
bit.  Note these five signals are the only signals an attacker would have access to on the 
lower tier.  This equates to 25% of cases in which the random bit could be inferred.  




physical logic block is which, F1, F2, F3 and F4.  As can be seen from the table, the order 
matters.  The attacker must also know which bit the intermediate outputs are being 
referenced to prior to being stored in the registers.  This can be either r1 or r2, and is 
easily changed by re-wiring the select signals on the multiplexers.  Finally the attacker 
must know which bit the returning signal g(t+1) is referenced to. 
 
Table 2.1. Possible input/output combinations and potential for discovery of r1 and r2 
when Fx output is referred to r1 
 
 
      
  Since the entire register block is located on a secure upper tier, the upper layer 
should be designed to take advantage of the different possibilities. For each register block 
there are 96 different permutations of input wiring and output references. The same 
lower, insecure, wafer could be bonded to any number of different possible upper layers, 
indiscriminately. Additionally, the upper tiers can be used for any lower tier design 
allowing bulk manufacturing of the upper tier for cost savings.  A different inference 
table is needed for each possibility and there is no way for an attacker to know which 
table is needed for any given chip. The possible number of upper tier variations is limited 




tier.  Furthermore, only a small number of upper tier variations need actually be 
manufactured.  The attacker would not know which ones had been used and would need 
to take all into account.  For a much more thorough explanation of Sequential RECORD 




3.  TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING 
RECORD provides excellent protection for custom ASIC designs both for 
combinational or sequential circuits.  It does however still carry large area and power 
overhead, approximately 3.75x  area and 4.5x power for Sequential RECORD.  
RECORD also benefits from a very simple and generic implementation that can be easily 
adapted to any design with no circuit specific logic or control.  Consequently, when area 
or power is at a premium a different approach is needed.  Time Division Multiplexing 
offers a perfect solution to reduce the power and area overhead.  The Sequential 
RECORD process contains four copies of the same logic.  This serves two purposes; it 
allows for quick parallel processing of the four input vectors and helps to confuse 
attackers.  TDM RECORD eliminates the duplication while at the same time opening up 
possibilities for an even more secure protection scheme. 
The intermediate combinational logic is copied four times and operated on in 
parallel.  The only difference between the blocks is that each block of logic is sent a 
different input vector.  In TDM RECORD, the four variant input combinations can be 
sent in sequence to just one copy of the intermediate logic instead of four.  The outputs of 
the intermediate logic are then stored in one of four register blocks before being de-
muxed to determine the final correct output.  
  The register blocks are not the same as in Sequential RECORD.  In Sequential 
RECORD each register stores the de-muxed output of the four input vectors before being 
re-indexed to the random bit on the next clock, Figure 2.3.   In TDM RECORD all four 
outputs are not available in the same clock cycle.  It now takes four periods to accumulate 




the first output is ready the subsequent outputs would be indexed against different 
random bits.   
Even if all the different random bits were stored for reference the de-muxing 
process would become invalid.  In order to overcome this issue, a slight modification of 
the process is needed.  Now each intermediate output vector, g1-4, will be stored until all 
four input vectors have completed.  Then the four stored outputs will be de-muxed with 
the two random bits as select signals, as before. The new output will then be re-indexed 
against two newly generated random bits before being sent on to the next set of 
intermediate logic, Figure 3.1.  This means that the random bits must be stored for four 
clocks cycles instead of changing on each cycle.  It also means that control logic is 
needed to orchestrate when new random bits are needed and into which register block the 









The entire process is illustrated in Figure 3.2.  At time, T, the incoming data 
vector is converted to dual rail representation with r1 and r2.  The new input bits, t, are 
then sent to the first logic block.  The output is then stored in register block 1.  In time, 
T+1, the same input bits, t, are sent back to the same logic block but with some of the 
inputs inverted as described in (3).  The outputs are stored in register block 2.  This 
process is repeated two more times with the input bits, t, being inverted or not inverted 
according to (3).  Finally in T+4, the register blocks are de-muxed using r1 and r2 as 
select signals.  Here r1 and r2 have not been allowed to change from cycle to cycle but 
have been stored since, T.  Then, in T+5 the random bits are allowed to change, the 




Figure 3.2. Conceptual data flow diagram for TDM RECORD process. Showing the first 




The security of the random bits is maintained with split manufacturing.  The 
upper tier would contain the control logic, the input multiplexers, registers with XOR 
gates, output registers and final de-mux and the bottom tier contains all of the 
intermediate logic.  Storing the random bits for four clock cycles does nothing to 
compromise the security.  An attacker would still need to wait until all four input data 
vectors have processed before attempting to infer the random bit, at which time the bit 
would change just as in Sequential RECORD.   
The complexity of the control logic is determined by the complexity of the 
application but it does eliminate the generic application of RECORD and Sequential 
RECORD.  While at the same time opening up two very important options.  First, 
Sequential RECORD was resistant to attackers inferring the random bits by reading the 
signals moving between upper and lower tiers.  However, remote possibilities still existed 
if the attacker knew which combinational block was receiving which input vector, which 
input bits were indexed against which random bits and finally the indexing of the 
returning register outputs.  By making use of the random number generator/s the control 
logic can randomly change the order in which the input vectors are presented to the logic.  
For example, the first iteration could present the input vectors in normal order (1,2,3,4) 
but the next iteration could be (2,3,1,4) and so on.  By doing this the inference table 
found in Table 2.1 is rendered useless.  
Secondly to further frustrate attackers the number of random bits can be 
increased.  Adding a third random bit was previously infeasible due to the excessive area 
and power overhead.  Now, that third random bit would increase the number of input 




additional register blocks and alterations to the control logic are needed.  At the same 
time greatly increasing the number of possible dual rail input permutations and upper tier 
permutations.   
The cost of the TDM RECORD process is time.  Latency is increased by a 
minimum of 5x or 9x in the case of the three random bit option.  Design time also 
increases, the TDM RECORD concept must be designed into the chip from the beginning 
and custom control is needed for each design. Finally, while power does decrease 




4. COTS APPLICATION  
RECORD in all its variations provides excellent protection against hardware 
Trojan attacks.  However, they are applicable only to custom ASIC chips. Quilt-
Packaging [13], used in the original RECORD process, and 3D manufacturing are not 
cheap.  The cost of manufacturing a RECORD or Sequential RECORD design would be 
many times the cost of a standard chip.  This may by acceptable in certain cases but may 
also be cost prohibitive.  Many applications, even military ones, are moving to COTS 
chips to meet specifications and budget.  These chips are even more susceptible to 
hardware Trojan injection since there may not be any hardware security plan in mind 
when they are designed.  A recent paper [14] has identified commercial parts as the 
number one area needing research and a solution for preventing hardware Trojans 
attacks.  The TDM RECORD process presents an opportunity to do just that. 
TDM RECORD requires a custom ASIC solutions since the design must be 
segregated into two tiers for the 3D manufacturing process and the internal registers must 
be moved to the upper tier.  This of course will not work for a COTS chip which is 
already manufactured.  A way is needed to interface with the COTS chip in such a way 
that any data leakage Trojans already present on the chips will be ineffective.  The 
solution is to move the TDM RECORD control logic to a separate chip, such as an 
FPGA.   
The registers on the COTS chip cannot be moved nor can they be individually 
accessed in most cases.  Consequently the TDM process of injecting the appropriate data 
vectors into each intermediate logic block is no longer applicable.  The second chip of the 




chip and wait for the chip to fully complete its operation, Figure 4.1.  In the case of a 
DES chip, this would take sixteen cycles to produce a final encoded output.  After which 
that output would be stored in the control chip and the next of four input vectors would 
be sent.  While this is going on, only one set of random bits is used and stored on the 
control chip.  There is no need to ever send them to the COTS chip so they are safe from 
detection.  When all four vectors have been processed, the control chip will de-mux using 
the random bits as select signals and convert back to single rail before sending the final 




Figure 4.1.  COTS RECORD data flow between two chips 
 
 
The COTS RECORD process is perhaps the most secure application of the 
RECORD design scheme.  At no time does a hardware Trojan present on the COTS chip 




since manufacture there is also no way for it to adapt and recognize that the RECORD 
process is in use. It will continue to leak data as before, however now the data will be 
only one half of a dual rail signal.  The control chip can make use of the TDM RECORD 
options to mix up the input order of the input data vectors.  The designers can add as 
many random bits to the process as desired. Again, the cost of the COTS RECORD 
process is mostly in processing time, and design time.  The additional board space of the 
control chip may also be a concern, especially in mobile devices, as well as the additional 
power requirements of that control chip.  When the design requires the use of a 
proprietary COTS chip or even IP core, the COTS RECORD process provides an 




5. DESIGN RESULTS 
The TDM and COTS RECORD processes were both implemented in VHDL to 
confirm functionality and evaluate impacts to area, power and performance.  The TDM 
process was implemented on a 64 bit Data Encryption Standard (DES) design [15] for 
direct comparison to Sequential RECORD and simulated using Modelsim Altera edition 
v.10.1d.  The design was synthesized with Cadence Encounter RTL Compiler v.13.10 
and Cadence Generic Process Design Kit (GPDK) 45nm to obtain power estimates.  The 
design was then fully laid out using Cadence Encounter RTL to GDSII v.13.23 to obtain 
an area estimate.  The COTS RECORD process was implemented in hardware on an 
Altera DE2 development board featuring a Cyclone II FPGA.  The control code written 
in VHDL was synthesized using Quartus II 13.0 sp.1.  The VHDL code was also 
synthesized in Cadence Encounter for more direct comparisons with Sequential 
RECORD and TDM RECORD also using the Cadence GPDK 45nm technology library. 
The TDM RECORD design of the 64 bit DES was found to have an area of 
15,440 µm
2
 compared to 7,619 µm
2
 for the original unaltered DES circuit.  This is an 
area increase of 2.02x.  Comparing that to the Sequential RECORD design area for the 
same DES circuit, 28,948 µm
2
, TDM RECORD reduces the area overhead by 63%.  The 
power usage for TDM RECORD at 31Mhz  has increased  by 1.96x over standard DES 
and has reduced the power overhead of Sequential RECORD by 56%.  Table 5.1 
summarizes the power and area overhead of TDM RECORD. 
      The cost of TDM record, as stated previously, is in performance or latency.  The 
original DES design requires 6.72ms to complete its testbench.  The new TDM RECORD 




Table 5.1.  Power and Area Comparison for TDM RECORD 
 Standard DES Sequential RECORD 
DES 
TDM RECORD DES 
Area µm
2
 7619 28,948 15,440 
Dynamic Power, mW 0.96 4.35 1.88 
Leakage Power, mW 0.044 0.138 0.097 
 
 
of 5.3x as was expected in the data flow of Figure 3.2.  The additional 0.3x is due to 
processing time needed for the Sequential RECORD process, such as converting to dual 
rail, re-indexing and selecting the appropriate data to pass to the next logic stage, etc.   
Total energy consumption would also increase since the same operation must be 
completed four times to get the same final result. For example, standard DES would 
consume 3.6 J of energy per operation, Sequential RECORD DES, 15.71 J for the same 
operation and TDM DES apx. 37.7 J.   
       The latency overhead could be further reduced with optimization of the source 
code.  For example, since the control logic knows what the random bits are it could 
perform a ‘smart’ selection of the intermediate logic outputs and simply drop the un-
needed data.  This would have the dual effect of reducing power and area.  Latency 
would also be reduced since the steps in time T+4 in Figure 3.2 would no longer be 
needed.  It may however open up the circuit to power analysis attacks since it would most 
likely be easy to see which round used more power by storing the data.  Further analysis 
is planned to explore the effect of power analysis on RECORD circuits.  Regardless, 
given today’s high clock speeds, often in the Ghz range, this increase in latency should 




       To illustrate the COTS RECORD concept, the FPGA was used as the control chip 
to operate an Intel 8294A Data Encryption Unit, which represented the Trojan infected 
COTS chip.  The Intel 8294A implements the National Bureau of Standards information 
processing encryption standard [16,17] more commonly known as DES.  This chip was 
used extensively in banking and other transactions well into the 1990’s.  The FPGA was 
loaded with custom logic to control the 8294A.  The 8294A was sent the four RECORD 
input data vectors and it returned four dual rail encoded output vectors, Figure 4.1.  The 
8294A was never ‘aware’ of the fact that the input data was dual rail encoded and it also 
never saw the random bits.  The dual rail encoded outputs from the 8294A were then de-
muxed on the FPGA and converted back to single rail before being output from the 




Figure 5.1.  Experiment setup showing Altera DE2 development board and Intel 8294A 






 This real hardware implementation serves not only to demonstrate COTS 
RECORD but also is the first real hardware implementation of the Sequential RECORD 
concept.  The area requirements are broken down in Table 5.2.  The COTS RECORD 
control logic, which includes a Trivium based random number generator [18,19], 
increased the 8294A control logic by 2.55x on the Cyclone II.  The random number 
generator (RNG) itself is quite large and other smaller random number generators may be 
available.  Control logic power has increased by 5.3x. 
       Again, the cost of COTS RECORD is in latency.  Processing time was measured 
with an HP54645D oscilloscope.  The standard control logic without RECORD measured 
44ms to complete the DES operation process.  The COTS RECORD control logic took 
172ms to complete the same operation, an increase of 3.9x.  The designer must also 
consider the extra space and cost of an additional chip on the board.  However, in some 
instances the COTS RECORD control could be integrated into a pre-existing 
microcontroller, FPGA or processor, greatly reduce the additional cost and space. 
 
Table 5.2.  Comparison of Area for COTS RECORD 
 8294A Control Logic COTS RECORD Control RNG 
Area FPGA, logic units 563 1436 416 
Area from layout, µm
2
 2368 8394 2532 
Dynamic Power, µW 18.67 98.3 33.67 






Two modifications to the Sequential RECORD design process have been 
explored.  Both offer area and power savings over the original Sequential RECORD 
process.  First TDM RECORD utilizes time division multiplexing concepts to reduce the 
area of a Sequential RECORD design by 63% and the power consumption by 56% in the 
example DES circuit, at the small cost of 5.3x increased latency and total energy 
consumption.  At the same time giving the designer greater flexibility to frustrate 
potential attacks by randomizing the order of input vector operation and even increasing 
the number of random bits.   
COTS RECORD has presented a method to simply and safely operate potentially 
infected COTS products, believed to be a first in hardware Trojan defense.  The COTS 
RECORD process splits the RECORD concept into two chips and results in an area 
increase of 2.55x and a power increase of 5.3x for the control logic.  All while increasing 
latency by only 3.9x in the example circuit.  COTS RECORD also gives the designer the 
option to easily increase the number of random bits and to randomize the order of input 
data operation.  These options, TDM and COTS, allow both the ASIC designer and the 
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2.   CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
2.1 CONCLUSIONS 
Current methods of hardware Trojan defense focus on either detecting the Trojan 
after production or preventing it from being inserted, all with varying degrees of success.  
All of the current methods suffer from some key weakness.  This dissertation has 
presented a new way of looking at hardware defense by shifting the paradigm from 
“detection/prevention” approach to a don’t care state.  In what is believed to be a first for 
hardware Trojan defense, the concepts explored here can prevent data leakage even when 
the full design is known to the attacker.  Three papers were presented which developed 
this idea. 
The first paper, RECORD, defined a method by which combinational logic 
circuits could be altered to prevent data leakage Trojans from capturing meaningful data 
on chip.  The RECORD method first utilizes a randomly generated number to dual rail 
encode the incoming data bits.  These new signals are then split and only one half of the 
signal is operated on by the combinational logic.  Further Boolean manipulation led to 
duplication of the original combinational logic which allowed the dual rail signal to be 
processed.  The method was implemented on an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
Substitution Box (Sbox) [15] circuit and synthesized with a 45 nm process.  The design 
incurred a 2.28x-2.33x area overhead and 1.7x-2.24x power overhead.  Impact to 
performance was only 0.06x increase in latency.  It is expected that as larger designs are 




power is acceptable when compared to other, commonly utilized, reliability methods such 
as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), which requires 3x area overhead.  It is expected 
that highly sensitive applications will be more concerned with security than size and 
power consumption. 
The RECORD process has a lower bound on area of approximately 2x.  The area 
cannot be less than that since the original circuit has been duplicated.  The precise value 
of the area overhead will approach 2x as the size of the original circuit increases.  The 
increase that derives from the extra RECORD circuitry, XOR gates, multiplexors, 
inverters etc., will then be minimized. 
The second paper described how the RECORD concepts could be successfully 
used on sequential logic.  Sequential RECORD expanded the Boolean equations of 
RECORD to include two random bits.  This in turn required quadrupling the intermediate 
combinational logic and adding update logic to the registers.  The design scheme moved 
away from Quilt Packaging to 3D split manufacturing to protect the random bit.  To 
demonstrate this process, a Data Encryption Standard (DES) [16] circuit was simulated 
using the Sequential RECORD design process.   The 45nm design showed an increase in 
area of 3.75x and an increase in power of 4.5x at 31Mhz.  The Sequential RECORD 
process added increased protection by increasing the possible dual rail combination and 
by utilizing the split 3D process.  The permutations of final assembled chips are limited 
only by the total number of registers in the design.  
The random number generator could present an upper bound for overall clock 
speed of the design.  The sequential RECORD process adds little in the way of additional 




generators can be relatively large and slow.  Whichever random number generator the 
designer chooses should be capable of generating two new random numbers on each 
clock at the required clock speed and should be capable of generating numbers that are 
difficult to guess, for example by selecting a seed which depends on some physical 
parameter and using a long random number sequence, or selecting the random numbers 
based on a physical random process.  
The final paper presented two new ideas to address the shortcomings of RECORD 
and Sequential RECORD. The first was the TDM RECORD process which drastically 
reduced area and power consumption, by 63% and 56% respectively over Sequential 
RECORD.  This was accomplished by creating custom control logic to feed each input 
bit vector to a single logic block in turn, instead of operating the input vectors in parallel.  
The resulting circuit operated at 5.3x slower latency compared to the Sequential 
RECORD design.  The TDM process was simulated utilizing the same DES design as 
Sequential RECORD for direct comparisons. 
 The COTS RECORD process was presented last.  Its key contribution is to allow 
previously manufactured chips to be utilized safely without any alteration.  The COTS 
process breaks out the control logic of TDM onto a separate chip which then sends each 
input vector to the commercial chip in turn.  The commercial chip, and any Trojan that 
may be on it, is never aware that the input data it is receiving is dual rail encoded.  The 
concept was implemented on real hardware utilizing an Altera DE2 development board as 
the control chip and an Intel 8294A data encryption unit as the ‘infected’ chip.  The 
control logic on the FPGA showed an increased area of 2.55x and increased power of 




really in latency which increased by 3.9x from 44ms to 172ms to complete the DES 
operation.   This is a small price to pay to open up the opportunity to safely utilize the 
COTS marketplace in secure environments. 
 
2.2 FUTURE WORK 
The RECORD design process can benefit from further investigations into 
optimizing the choice of dual rail input bits.  Each of the RECORD design options 
include numerous choices on which input bits to convert to dual rail and which inputs are 
converted using which random bits.  Paper I includes extensive data on these options.  
The TDM and COTS processes also open up the door to utilizing more than two random 
bits.  Developing a process or algorithm to determine the optimum combination for 
reduced area and power for a given circuit would be very useful.  Also needed would be 
finding the optimum tradeoff between latency and increased randomness of any extra 
random bits.  These options could be explored using a hill climber technique or a 
specially constructed neural net.  
The effect of the 3D manufacturing process on overall area has not been explored. 
The area overhead presented in Papers II and III is simply add in the increased area of the 
upper tier as if it were all incorporated into a single die.  In reality, the upper tier would 
be on top of the outsourced lower tier and would not take up as much overall area in the 
final chip design.  This is especially true for TDM RECORD since the lower tier contains 





Design time and effort can become an issue for very large sequential designs.  
Ideally the RECORD process would be implemented from the start of the circuit design 
and incorporated directly into the VHDL or Verilog code.  This may not be possible in 
many cases, and the process of converting a traditional design so it can be used with the 
RECORD process can be quite tedious if the RECORD designer is working from an 
already completed chip.  Therefore, implementation of any of the RECORD processes 
should be automated.   The best place for such an automation algorithm to start would be 
the final netlist.  The automated process could then easily see what modules should be 
duplicated or quadrupled.  The automated process could also easily identify and segregate 
all of the internal registers, moving them to a new module which would then become the 
secure upper tier. Automating the conversion process is not expected to be difficult. 
The RECORD process is believed to be secure however, a concerted effort should 
be made to ‘break’ the RECORD process from the point of view of a hardware Trojan.  
Since this method claims only to resist data leakage hardware Trojans that type of Trojan 
should be used to try to leak meaningful data from a RECORD design.  Full knowledge 
of the chip design should be made available to the attackers, or ‘red team’.   
An analysis of the RECORD processes’ resistance to side channel power analysis 
attacks, such as Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [17], would also be very interesting.  
DPA and its variants look for patterns in the power signature of a chip to determine the 
data that is being processed.  It is a different kind of attack from hardware Trojans but 




At first glance, it would seem that the RECORD processes would provide some 
defense against these attacks given the randomization of the internal signaling.  Further 






STEP BY STEP IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR SEQUENTIAL 
RECORD 
 The following is a step by step instruction set for implementing a Sequential 
RECORD version of a pre-existing design.  When a designer is starting from scratch with 
a design, the RECORD concepts should be written into the hardware description.  The 
split manufacturing, either Quilt Packaging or 3D, will still have to be implemented 
manually during layout. 
1- Synthesize the design using the desired technology library to obtain a netlist. 
2- Edit the netlist by creating a new top level module.  This module will contain all 
of the registers (flip flops) in the design. 
3- Route all inputs and outputs through the new module.  Any sub-modules will now 
be called from here. 
4- Move ALL registers from the lower sub-modules to the new top modules. Verify 
connectivity to the sub-modules and confirm the circuit still functions properly. 
5- Add a random number generator of your choice to the top module. 
6- Now begin implementation of the RECORD process.  First take all incoming data 
bits and convert them to dual rail with XOR gates.  You may choose which bits 
are indexed to either r1 or r2.  The inputs to each gate are the input bit, x, and 
either r1 or r2. You will end up with a new input vector of variable t. 
7- Take the first sub-module, formerly the top level module, and create four 




8- The t vector will be routed as inputs to each of the four instances.  Remember that 
each instance will receive a different version of t inputs.  The easiest way to do 
this is to create a ‘t not’ vector by inverting t.  Then simply select the required bits 
from either t or t not and send them to the appropriate instance. So, the first 
instance gets all t inputs.  The next gets even bits inverted.  The third gets odd bits 
inverted and the last gets all bits inverted.  See figure 3.3 on page 47. 
9- Take the outputs of the four instances and invert the third and fourth output 
vectors. 
10-  Route the outputs from the first two instances and the inverted outputs of the 
third and fourth to a four-to-one multiplexor.  This must be done for each bit.  For 
example, a 64 bit output requires 64 multiplexors.   
11- This step is very important.  Make sure you understand how your multiplexors 
are wired and function.  Wire r1 and r2 as select signals.  Wire the multiplexor so 
that ‘r1=0, r2=0’ selects the first instance, ‘r1=0, r2=1’ selects the second, ‘r1=1, 
r2=0’ selects the third and ‘r1=1, r2=1’ selects the fourth.   If r1 is the most 
significant select signal bit then the input to the register will be referenced to r1.  
If you switch the bits then the de-muxed register input will be referenced to r2.   
12- Wire the mux output to the appropriate register. 
13- Create update signals.  First store the previous clock cycle random bit that you 
chose as the de-muxed reference bit in step 11.  XOR that signal with the current 
cycle r1 and r2 to create two update signals. 
14- On each register, send the output to an XOR gate as one of the inputs and the 




the update signals.  Mix it up so that some bits use the r1 reference and the others 
use r2.   
15- Create an inverted version of the vector you created in step 14.  
16- Route the data to the next set of quadrupled sub-modules, just as in step 8. 
17- Repeat until the entire circuit has been processes. 
18- When the final stage data returns from the final set of quadrupled sub-modules, 
de-mux with four to one multiplexors as in step 11.  The next step depends on the 
design.  If the data is routed directly off chip, then all output bits must be XOR’d 
again with the appropriate random bit, see step 11, to convert back to single rail.  
If the data will be stored for multiple clock cycles then XOR with the appropriate 
random bit before storing in the register.  This way the final output data will be in 
single rail and will not need to be continually re-indexed. 
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